Delegates and other COP30 attendees exiting the Blue Zone. Photo by Lindsay Crowder

The world learned a truth in Brazil this week, just not the one it may have preferred. The 

 of the COP30 presidency was published late on Saturday morning, hours before the final plenary—an exercise originally scheduled for 10am, then 11am, before finally starting three hours late. The preamble pitched the process as a “COP of Truth” intended to restore “trust and hope in the fight against climate change by bringing science, equity and political determination together, promoting information integrity and strengthening multilateralism, connecting the process with people on the ground and accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

They were pretty words, followed by little action. All mention of fossil fuels were stripped from the Mutirão—a word originally from the Tupi-Guarani language to describe an act of mutual aid undertaken without payment and given to the primary decision document at COP30. For all the symbolism it invoked, the document contained no explicit talk about phasing out fossil fuels. There were only two references to the United Arab Emirates Consensus—a binding agreement made at COP28 in Dubai two years before to phase out oil, gas and coal in line with the science—enough to make sure the promise was not forgotten, but not enough to remember what was pledged. Once again, there were no provisions for climate finance to aid adaptation. Commitment to the Paris Agreement was reaffirmed, but any language that would have delivered on making this the promised  “implementation COP” was absent.

The list of issues with the final text was long.

COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago, however, gavelled through the materials at speed. He opened the session with technical matters and, before anyone knew what happened, the texts were adopted, over and above simmering objections. The deal done, COP30 President Lago took a moment to acknowledge his critics.

“We know some of you have greater ambitions for some of the issues that happened,” Lago said. “I know the youth and civil society will demand us to do more to fight climate change. I want to affirm that I will try not to disappoint you during my presidency of this COP.”

It was then De Lago announced he would work for the rest of his presidency to develop two roadmaps, one on halting and reversing deforestation and another on transitioning away from fossil fuels to loud applause.

“They will be led by science, and they will be inclusive,” he said. “With the spirit of the Mutirão, we will convene high level dialogs, gathering key international organizations, governments, from both producing and consuming countries, industry workers, scholars, civil society, and will report back to the COP. We will also benefit from the first international conference for the phase out of fossil fuels, scheduled to take place in April in Colombia.”

What this actually means is an open question. Many well-intentioned initiatives have been launched at COPs past only to die in obscurity, and any proposal to develop a plan for a roadmap to phase out fossil fuels would test the limits of credulity. Civil society groups, for their part, weren’t buying it.  Carolina Pasquali, Executive Director, Greenpeace Brazil said the COP30 text represented a win for fossil fuel producers.

“This was a crossroad—a properly funded path to 1.5°C or a highway to climate catastrophe—and while many governments are willing to act, a powerful minority is not,” she said.

Climate scientist Bill Hare from Climate Analytics said there was no point “embracing the science” if it was not met with action.

“The traditional COP model is under serious strain in a fractured, multipolar world, particularly from countries prepared to sacrifice the well-being of the world for fossil fuel interests,” he said.

The real tell was in the final line–one that foreshadowed what was about to happen next. COP30 in Belém was meant to be Brazil’s show, but late in the second week Colombia upstaged their hosts when it announced the creation of an initiative whereby a group of countries would meet to plan the phase out of fossil fuels. The 24-country bloc will meet next April in Santa Marta for a conference co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands. Other participating countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Panama, Spain, Slovenia, Vanuatu and Tuvalu.

Brazil had reportedly brushed off approaches by Colombia about how its external proposal might work with the COP process in the days leading up to the announcement. When it finally arrived—delayed by a fire in the exhibition hall that left a gaping hole in the roof and the acrid smell of burnt plastic in the area—Colombia’s Environment and Sustainable Development Minister, Irene Vélez Torres, framed it as a counterweight to reactionary forces that sought to block climate action at every COP.

“I think what the problem is right now is the methodology of consensus, because this consensus has turned into veto,” Torres told reporters on Thursday in Belém. “So the most ambitious agenda has been eliminated. Veto is what is happening here.”

If it should succeed—a big “if”—the group could contribute to a growing diplomatic, political and legal momentum developing outside the COP process, alongside initiatives like the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty promoted by Pacific Nations. Were it able to grow its membership and draft an actionable plan for fossil fuel phaseout, the group could offer a means to push back against reactionary groups seeking to slow the end of oil, gas and coal.

If Brazil had been feeling upstaged by Colombia, that feeling would become a reality in the closing plenary. Following a series of complaints about procedural matters, Colombia took the floor. They had been overlooked, they alleged. Colombia had wanted to add specific language calling for work to be undertaken to plan a phase out of fossil fuels, but had been ignored in the rush to pass the agreement. This sequence of events left them no choice: they formally objected to the final text.

At first, Lago tried to breeze past the objection. It didn’t stand. Colombia insisted on the intervention and the effect was like kicking over the table at a poker game. The final plenary was suspended as a crowd of delegates rushed to confer on stage. Any suspicion that this amounted to political theatre faded as audible criticism could be heard over the microphones. No one, least of all the delegates, seemed to know what would happen next.

It was yet another unprecedented development in an event already heavy with metaphor. The United States had stayed home, though its chief negotiators still roamed the halls of the Blue Zone, having secured passes under other organizations, and China had taken an unusually prominent role. Some pavilions flooded at the start of the second week, thanks to heavier than usual rains. Then the total evacuation of the Blue Zone following a fire on Friday cost a full day of negotiations at a critical moment. No COP has run to time in two decades, and Belém never had good odds to begin with, but there was no hope after the fire. Taking advantage of the interregnum, the Brazilian COP Presidency locked itself away before releasing a draft text in the early hours of the morning. For all the talk of a COP of truth and the need for action, the result was a document that refused to say the “f” word. The commitment to “information integrity” rang hollow given its position in the preamble, a segment of the text normally reserved for platitudes, and the lack of meaningful commitment to fossil fuel phaseout that followed it.

The approach would have been to the liking of Saudi Arabia, which has been one of the primary forces of obstruction at every COP and historically acted as a proxy for the United States. The two major BRICs countries, India and Russia seemed to be in lock step with Saudi Arabia, expressing their gratitude to the Brazilian presidency in the final plenary. A group of 29 countries threatened a veto if the provisions calling for fossil fuel phaseout were not restored, forcing negotiations to continue long into the night and early Saturday morning in Belém, but ultimately did nothing to change the text.

An earlier fight concerned who would host COP31 in 2026. The two candidates, Australia and Turkiye, had been deadlocked over hosting rights for the better part of two years. The dispute was decided by a combination of Turkish brinkmanship, 

 and cynical domestic Australian political maneuvering. The result was a novel hybrid model where Turkiye will formally host the COP but Australian Climate Minister Chris Bowen will serve as “COP President for Negotiations”. When the text outlining the arrangement was finally published online, reactions varied. Some 

 Australia had negotiated itself a subordinate position where it took on all the risk and Turkiye had the final say. Dean Bialek, a former climate negotiator said the artful vagaries of diplomatic language and convention were easily misunderstood, and Australia had actually managed to take control of the most important functions of the COP Presidency.

“It's a significant role,” Bialek said. “It's a very disappointing outcome, and many in Australia will see it as a significant step back from the original intention and expectation.

“That being said, the way that the partnership document is constructed, I think, makes it pretty clear that Chris Bowen will have a pretty much unfettered authority.”

According to Climate Action Network Latin America, the one bright spot in the final COP presidency text was the creation of a mechanism within the Just Transition Work Program (JTWP), which they said “represents a significant political victory for Latin America.”

“The text incorporates most of the principles proposed by civil society, providing a substantive basis from which to move forward,” the group said in a statement. It also invites countries to integrate national pathways and recognizes the need for additional financing. However that win was tempered by the fact that operationalization of the mechanism was kicked down the road to COP31.

From beginning to the bitter end, COP30 was a tussle. As the plenary resumed, Lago delivered an apology for his procedural mistake, blaming sleep deprivation and his “advanced age”. Officially, though, a decision had been made, the text had been finalized and adopted, and there was no way to re-open it. To do so would set a bad precedent. Colombia’s objection would be noted and any issues it raised would be addressed in Bonn, Germany next year. The decision stopped the talks collapsing but chaos reigned. Russia accused the Latin American countries of behaving like children “who want to get their hands on all the sweets and stuff them down their throats”, prompting a unique moment of Latin American unity. India, too, threw barbs at Colombia and Panama, while Saudi Arabia persisted in seeking technical clarifications. It was the sort of scene that has prompted scholars of the COP process to suggest it is beyond repair unless the requirement for consensus is changed to a seven-eighths majority that would “stop a few obstructive countries from vetoing things the other 190 agree on,” as a recently published compendium of the peer-reviewed research on climate obstruction 

Throughout COP30, the scientific community had repeatedly and clearly emphasized the threat posed by a failure to act. Though the process did secure more scrutiny of fossil fuel producers, some money for forests and adaptation, and a new emphasis on trade and implementation, it only inched towards working through the collective phase out of oil, gas and coal. By its end, COP30 in Belém failed to secure any new agreement on ending the fossil fuel age, forcing the world to wait yet another year to see if global leaders will ever make good on their Paris promises.

COP-tastrophe: How the COP of Implementation, Truth, Forests, and Indigenous Peoples Failed on All Counts

 [00:00:00] Hello and welcome back to Drilled. I'm Amy Westervelt In a little under a week, the Annual UN Climate Summit, the conference of the parties-- it's called that because these are all of the people who are party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or the UNFCCC and they meet every year to talk about what their governments are gonna do about climate change.

This is year 30, and I think it's fair to say that this process is facing a real crisis of legitimacy at the moment. This year, the US government has barred any of its officials from attending to negotiate, so that should be interesting. For the last couple years, the gloves have been completely off when it comes to fossil fuel executives being involved in this process, we had first COP 28 in Abu Dhabi where the president of the national oil company was also the president of the Climate Summit. And then last year in Baku, in Azerbaijan, where similarly loads of folks involved in the petroleum business were part of the COP organizing committee, and there were just blatant oil deals happening all over the conference.

This year's COP is being held in the Brazilian Amazon, which is quite interesting. And the Brazilian government and the conference organizing committee have really made a commitment to information integrity around climate. They wanna highlight this issue. They would like to see something around information integrity actually being adopted into the final commitments coming out of this COP, and they have made a big commitment to keeping things like climate denial out of this conference.

However, as we know on this show, there are lots of different ways that disinformation can make its way into climate conversations. And what we're gonna talk about today is the way that climate obstruction makes its way into international negotiations. So not just the COP, but also the intergovernmental panel on climate change.

These are not, you know, super objective uncorrupted and uncorruptible processes as much as they're often described that way. And as much as we might like for them to be. So today a very interesting conversation with Carrie Derick from University of Geneva and Eduardo Viola from the Institute of International Relations in Brazil, about how climate obstruction shows up in international negotiations.

That conversation is coming up after this quick break.

 I'm gonna start with the very, very basics, which is to have you guys define for people what is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and why are we looking at these bodies for climate obstruction?

 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the basic document, the foundational document of the climate regime. Okay? And the most important thing is it's settled the goal that humanity should, reduce emissions for avoiding dangerous climate change.

This was very important document sudden in 1992, was very important example of multilateral limbs at the end of the Cold War and with the optimistic spirit, let's say, of great potential of human collaboration. Okay?

 Yep. And We have the UN FCC because the [00:04:00] IPCC, uh, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established in 1988, before the UN FCC was established to build the case scientifically for an international climate negotiations.

Since the nineties, the IPCC has been producing main assessment reports. So now we are entering the seventh assessment cycle. And all those reports and assessments have been the scientific basis of the, the negotiations. That's why the IPCC does play a key role in how we understand the climate problems as well as the solutions that's being discussed a lot in the negotiations. And that's why we also wanted to include it because it's quite related. And we often see that many of the experts, the government representatives, they actually [00:05:00] travel from IPCC to UNFCCC meetings. So there is a, a clear connection and links between those two institutions.

 Great. Okay. And you mentioned in the chapter that there's only kind of recently been research that's laid out a framework for looking at obstruction in the UNFCCC. Can you say a little bit more about that? What is that research and what is the framework for looking at obstruction??

 So there has been already quite some research on climate obstruction in the UNFCCC. By Joanna Deplage, for instance, but they were focusing on some specific countries. And what we've seen with the publication recently by Danielle Falzon and her colleagues is this kind of first attempts at having a comprehensive framework of what climate obstruction means in the UNFCCC and in their paper published in Global Environmental Politic, They do [00:06:00] identify four different main ways to to do obstruction. One being limiting the scope of an issue. Whether it's being only discussed within a dialogue, whether it is going to lead to some decisions that parties are supposed to take into account. We have also the question of reducing transparency in terms of how much data is available to understand a specific problem, knowing that the authors actually use the case of loss and damage in their study. We have also questions around manipulating language. How are we going to, to define and speak about loss and damage? And for instance, there is this interesting case in the negotiations where the negotiations with use and speak of loss and damage in the singular and with capital letters, whereas in the [00:07:00] IPCC and in some of the technical discussions in the UNFCCC, they will mention losses and damages.

So using the plural and lower cases. And the final element is the question of promoting non transformative solutions. So solutions that do not necessarily question the structural aspects and reasons that are responsible for the climate crisis we are in.

 Yeah, I would like to add a kind of more structural dimension of obstruction, that is what are the, the basis of the behavior of states. And it's a lot related to some str structural dimension. Like for example the carbon intensity of their economies. The level, the share of global carbon emissions the per [00:08:00] capita emissions, the dependence of their economies on fossil fuels.

So those are I mean, those, those issues are not matter of negotiation, but they shape the the behavior of most states. Not all the states, but most states. And so the, there is this always present in the negotiation. This, that the states don't don't want to, to do, for example, to if they have high carbon intensity in their economy, don't want to reduce the carbon intensity, or if they have a trajectory of growing carbon emission, they don't want to diminish the growing trajectory of their carbon emission and so on.

 Right. And that comes up in the IPCC as well, right? That they, the higher, well, at least the [00:09:00] fossil fuel producers or the bigger AG producers tend to bring those issues in at the IPCC level as well.

 Yes, totally. And maybe to name a few. What we have seen from different studies is, I mean, we have the usual suspects like Saudi Arabia for instance. There has been a lot of work on how the Saudi is trying to obstruct the deliberations within UNFCCC and the IPCC. But we have also seen not heavily around questions of loss and damage equity issues at the United States as well. European countries also being more and more critical about acknowledging what it means to take seriously, especially financially, what it means to take loss and damage and compensation seriously. But we have also seen global south countries as well, and Eduardo probably knows better, but [00:10:00] also countries like China, Brazil, India also tend to try to put more emphasis on their right to development. Not acknowledging that today they also are big economies and also pollute far more than they did 10 years ago.

 Mm-hmm. Yeah. Actually, I wanted to ask you to define the principle of common, but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities. Can you define what that means and, and how it gets leveraged in these negotiations

 well in, I mean, this is a key pillar of the Rio Convention, but at the Rio it is,

 Big. Okay. So, and so, and apart from dividing the world in a very simplified world. Developed countries and developing countries. Okay. And so. [00:11:00] It doesn't consider that developing countries are extremely stratified.

I mean, in terms of per capita income. So, and what, this is one of the problems of the Rio convention that this has not used, it, the classification of countries of the world Bank that is much better, more sophisticated, and classify the countries in four levels. High income, high middle income, low middle income, and low income.

Okay, so one problem with this principle is how high middle income countries use being in the category of developing countries for avoiding taking significant responsibility. Okay, but the principle say that everybody is responsible. For climate change, but some countries are more responsible and some countries have the [00:12:00] obligation, the countries that are more responsible, that have produced it historically, the idea historically is, is debatable.

A lot of things remain vague. So\, the interpretation of the principle became a major problem in the dynamic of the convention. In my view, this is one of the weakest, not, not the principle, but the fact that there was not a more complex classification of developing countries.

 Maybe what we can also add is that the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015 kind of changed a bit how CBDRRC is being interpreted and discussed because it adds in the light of national circumstances. And that's kind of supposed, it's another of those very vague expressions that you find in the Paris Agreement and in the UNFCCC. But [00:13:00] it, it is supposed to highlight the fact that some economies now in some countries do play a bigger role in how much they, they emit and especially emerging countries. And that's supposed to be assigned to bring them on board also to, to take ambitious actions. So it's an an attempt to try to add another layer of differentiation in the UNFCCC but knowing that it's still very contested and still today being discussed a lot in the negotiations.

 I wanted to ask you more about that as well, because there was that change and there were a few other kind of key changes in the Paris Agreement that shifted things a little bit. So I was hoping you could talk about that. You mentioned you know, a, like this, this difference around developing countries, but I know there was also the hybrid multilateralism thing introduced and, and kind of bringing non-state [00:14:00] actors in more.

So. I, I wonder if you could talk a bit about how Paris changed the negotiations and also the pathways to obstruction a little bit.

 The Paris Agreement is a product of the failure of the reform of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol set a kind of mandatory, goals of reduction emission for developed countries. Okay. So the, the, the Kyoto Protocol was based in the idea of precision in relation to the obligations of developed countries but not in relation to developing country, of course.

So what happened is that at the time of the reform of the Kyoto Protocol, there was an idea that the principle of mandatory the principle of having mandatory goals should be extended to all countries. of course, very different kind of [00:15:00] mandatory according to their, to the per capita income and cap and, and capabilities, let's say.

But this failed Okay. For many reasons. Yeah. And so the Paris Agreement was kind of, second best in relation to something and stronger agree at the same time. It is a principle that bottom up each country say what I can do and and I'll implement. And there is no idea of any punishment if you don't implement significant punishment, let's say. Okay, that it wasn't the Kyoto Protocol, but was for, didn't have enough teeth anyway. So, from this point of view, this is a major change. It's universal that any country has obligations, but the obligations are defined by each country according to.

Whatever criteria. [00:16:00] Okay. And there is, and there is no let's say there is no, these obligations are not mandatory. were attempts of saying, okay, these are the, the goals should be mandatory should be legally binding. Okay. But there was the strong opposition of the United States and India to this kind of in, well, India is more complex, okay?

But the, the, the United States, not because of the, not necessarily the Obama administration. Was the case, but the Obama administration was saying, knew that the to pass in the American Senate, any treat that had legally binding goals of reduction emissions would not pass that this, the American Senate that is very difficult to pass any international treaty in the American Senate historically.[00:17:00]

 On your point on the role of non-state actors I think that's also an important shift that we saw with the signature of the, the Paris agreement, where we knew while negotiating the, the treaty that adding up the voluntary commitments by countries wouldn't lead us to limit the the global warming to two degree or 1.5. And that's what, what is being called the emission gap and the, the idea. Was that this emission gap could be reduced by giving non-state actors, and especially obviously the, the private sector a bigger role in the, in the transition. So that's why with the Paris Agreement, we have this whole discussions around hybrid multilateralism, about orchestration of the action [00:18:00] of non-state actors to try to reduce this emissions gap in a context in which in the past the private sector was kind of more like either opposed or in favor of of a treaty of the Kyoto Protocol, notably. But then we saw really changes around the Paris Agreement with the private sectors and the industry wanting to play also a bigger role and also not only at the national level, but also internationally to bring up and to, to have this kind of bigger dialogue and initiatives being also discussed at the multilateral level.

 So you mentioned in this chapter, and we talked a little bit about it already, but the sort of operations of the UNFCCC and the IPCC and how those enable or empower obstruction. And I was hoping you could talk about that a little bit, just what are some of the ways that, these organizations [00:19:00] are set up to allow obstruction.

 I can start and mention two and then Eduardo can, can jump in anytime. I I think first there is the question of access and participation to both the IPCC and UNFCCC in the sense that even though everyone, like every representative of a country is welcome to participate and be part of those institutions.

It does require quite a lot of resources, human resources, but also financial resources. For the IPCC, it also mean quite a lot of epistemic resources, being able to understand the very technical discussions that go on in the IPCC and that that does mean-- because they are huge asymmetries and structural asymmetries between countries-- that does mean that often those who have the most capacities are also the most represented [00:20:00] in those institutions because they can send more delegates. They can also stay overnight. They can stay longer if the negotiations do not finish on time. And so ab obviously that makes them have bigger influence on what's going on in those institutions.

And and the second I think is, and that's also similar and it's a practice and procedure in both institution, is the fact that decisions are taken by consensus, which means that, every country has a say and a voice, and can at any time oppose a decision, oppose an agreement, which means that everything has to be made to try to find a compromise to get them on board.

And that gives some countries, and especially those countries who wants to do obstruction also a big leeway and a big way to kind of really try to to slow down the debate or have their views reflected.

 Yeah, this is actually the, the [00:21:00] idea of the consensus is one of the major vulnerabilities of con the convention of, and the whole history of the, the regime. Okay? So that is that the just one country, and particularly if it, if it is a country with some power, again, it doesn't even, not, doesn't need to be the strongest power.

You can you can diminish. The, the what is the agreement? And so this is the idea that the consensus give the negotiation to the final decision of minimum common denominator, meaning the minimal ambition for fighting global warming.

 When I was reading this chapter, especially this part about how I don't know, access and resources really come to play in the IPCC and the UNFCCC, it also made me think about the academic [00:22:00] research and the funding of it and how much more industry funding there is for that research in some countries than others.

And I wonder I guess, yeah, just how much that comes into play as an obstruction tactic as well.

 I think yeah, that's a difficult question because yeah, the IPCC is not being funded by the, the private sector, it's being funded by the governments on a voluntary basis. But it's true that in the selection of the authors, it's possible because it's being done based on the list provided by governments.

It's possible to have authors who have been working for fossil fuel companies. We know, for instance, of authors from ExxonMobil or Saudi Aram Aramco, who have been authors in some of the IPCC assessments. But I, and I wouldn't say it's necessarily [00:23:00] because of them that we have this kind of openness to carbon capture and storage or carbon dioxide removal, which, which has been documented in the last reports. I think it, in general, the IPCC also wants to work very closely with the private sector and also wants, and it's part of a bigger narrative in which non-state actors and the private sector does play a big role in providing the solutions.

So it's, it's really part of a bigger change. And that's, that's what the, I think the interesting point. Yeah. IPCC was kind of said, okay, let's, let's have closer links. And we know from the previous president, Hoesung Lee, for instance, was really open to having greater dialogues and input from from the, the big business industry. And so that might be one of the reasons through the leadership of the [00:24:00] IPCC, through the authors who are being part of the, the report that we tend to give those technologies big roles in, in the transition. Even though it's been criticized a lot, IPCC is aware of that. They, they have been discussions about how to also show some of the negative impacts that those, those technologies can have not on, on biodiversity for instance or water security.

 Yeah. Interesting. Okay. Can we talk about which countries are the biggest problem? Which countries are the big obstructors? We know the United States so we can talk about the United States more for sure. But what are, the big obstructors, you, you mentioned them in this chapter, and I'd like to have you kind of list them and then give some examples of the kinds of things that they do to [00:25:00] obstruct at at the international level.

 Yeah, so I guess the most obvious one, the most that has been discussed a lot in the literature, also in media reporting is, is Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is very open and in a way, and very, like, not deranged or it's not posing Saudi Arabia problem of being finger pointed as obstructing the negotiations and putting its, its video.

I think it's even part of the DNA, it's part of the identity of the Saudi delegation to be, to have this very kind of aggressive very forthcoming position and in the negotiations. So that's the kind of obvious one. I, I would say, but in a way, in a way, extremely well done. I [00:26:00] mean, it's, it's impressive to see the Saudi navigate the different rooms and have their point of view being presented and listed in the discussion.

So it's, it's very effective and it's, it's not something they, they are not, they are really thinking, I think, very clearly about how to organize themselves and how to, to influence the negotiations. The second one probably the biggest in a, in a way, but it's the United States, United States-- I think the difference with the Saudi is that United States cares about its about the public opinion. It cares about what. What people are going to say and see of, of the United States within the negotiations, but also outside as, as wanting to have this kind of leadership role in the negotiations.

Even though in practice we know the United States has left and withdrew from the Kyoto protocol, from the Paris Agreement. Is [00:27:00] a big opposer of historical responsibilities, which I think is obviously a very big problem given that we need to have ambitious, but also just action. The United States also has been really opposing a lot the loss and damage discussions in the negotiations really opposing any discussions in terms of reparation and compensation. And that's why it took so many decades to have the loss and damage fund

 There is a significant di difference between Republican and democratic administration. So in general speaking it's a country that produce a lot of obstruction even in Democratic administration. But I mean the, particularly the, the Biden administration was the, the first time that the United States has really a, a climate policy because Obama didn't have. [00:28:00] It was take some measures by executive order, but didn't have a climate policy. So we have a climate policy in United States for the first time that is basic in promoting renewable energy and nuclear energy, not in reducing because this, this, this is wouldn't have support in Congress.

But anyway, the difference between the Biden administration and the second Trump administration in terms of the impacting the global climate policy is giant, giant. I mean, the impact of, and this is one problem that is very important. We are now living in a world that's extremely conflicted, extremely based in the priority of hard geopolitics considerations. Okay. In a, a well in which the military spending is growing a lot, most countries, eh, and so the world in which we are now is somehow [00:29:00] the opposite of the world of 92 when the climate regime was born, and even the world of 2015 when the Paris Agreement was signed.

Okay? So the negotiations were always difficult for the reasons we have mentioned and are in the chapter. And now the, the negotiations have a much more obstacle because of the, this news geopolitical and particularly now with the Trump administration, that is not, even, not being, not being in the, in the agreement it is impacting, he's impacting a lot, many countries.

Okay? So openly or not. So, this is a consideration by United States, and I will say that another obstacle that has be, that is, has been important is the position of China until 2014. Previous to Paris agreement, [00:30:00] China was has a non-cooperative policy at all. Okay? In 2014, after the negotiation between Obama and Xi Jinping there was, it moved from a non-cooperative to partially cooperative position in the negotiations. So this was very important for sure, and risky, the Paris Agreement would not happen without this change in the Chinese position. But still so until now, see China, China has become right. A continued building coal feed the thermopower thermopower plants but at the same time is a superpower of of renewables.

Okay? And this is very important for China and for the world. But still, China continues, consider itself as a developing country, and this is a major problem for the advance of the negotiations.

 Can I have you guys define [00:31:00] the difference between procedural and substantive obstruction, and then maybe give some examples of those both in the UNFCCC and the IPCC.

 Yeah, so I can give you broadly a, a kind of overview and then we can discuss examples. So we, we wanted in this chapter to have a easy way to, look at obstruction in a way and that's why we differentiated between procedural obstruction and substantial obstruction, knowing that obviously they are also clearly related. So looking at procedural obstruction is more when when a country tried to delay the deliberation when it puts its veto on some decisions. As, as we mentioned, that it's very important to, for [00:32:00] decisions to be taken by consensus. So some countries do use a lot. Their veto to have the views reflected in in the documents.

And those can be UNFCCC policy decisions, but also IPCC Summaries for Policymakers. It can be also about taking the floor a lot to delay the deliberations that can then, then will be extended over the day. Sometimes will be also extended overnight, which makes it very difficult for small delegations to be part of the, of the negotiations. And substantial obstruction is then more about being obstructive on how a specific thematic area is going to be addressed and object. This can be done by delaying the discussions. And this can be for instance when, discussing fossil fuel phase out in the negotiations. And [00:33:00] that took so many years and decades even to, to finally have a, a proper discussion about fossil fuel phase out. But there are other examples in the chapter about yeah, loss and damage discussions and how for a long time it has been kind of framed around the question of adaptation.

And that only recently some negotiations have been allowed also to develop independently on loss and damage.

 Something I thought was really interesting in this chapter, and maybe surprising for people who don't follow this so closely, is that there's almost never is energy being discussed explicitly in these negotiations. So I, I wonder if you could talk about that and, and sort of why it was a big deal that in you know, at, at the wrap up of, I think it was COP 28, that they [00:34:00] actually mentioned fossil fuels in in those negotiations. But yeah, why is energy not being talked about in, in explicit terms in these negotiations?

 I mean, I would say that there was, at the moment of the Rio Convention, there was, this, is all these things are related to the limitations and vulnerabilities of the Rio Convention. Okay? So what happened at that time countries that were leading like the European Union. They were expecting that the most important was to reach a consensus to reach a treaty. Okay? So then, for example, if United States was against introducing energy openly in, in the discussion. Also, obviously all the oil exported, for example. Okay. At that. So it is amazing that [00:35:00] energy is not discussed.

It's amazing that just in 28 there was a mention to going transition away from fossil years. Really, really is, and this is kind of say in my view the general limitations of the convention, eh, that anyway has produced global public awareness about the issue because imagine without the convention, the world, without the convention, without a, an, the annual discussions about this.

So the public awareness in the world about climate change would be dramatically lower. Okay. So the convention has been very important. The negotiations sometimes have been not useful, but generally there is a trajectory of progress, but with all these limitations, so I would say energy is very, is not discussed [00:36:00] because all the countries that are carbon intensive in the production of energy are against.

 And there is this famous statement by Saudi Arabia which, which was that the UNFCCC is not an energy treaty. So we should discuss, we can discuss emissions but we shouldn't go too much into the details of how we can reduce those emissions and how we can also think about fossil fuel phase outs.

But what is, what is interesting is, and that's part of the, chapter as well, and that's work that has been done by a colleague of ours, Stefan Aku, which is that. In a way, fossil fuels have been discussed in in the UNFCCC policy meetings, but through the impact of climate policy on fossil fuel economies, and that's [00:37:00] what is being called response measures.

And it's, it's agenda item in the negotiations that has been there for several decades. And that's where the consequences of the response measures are being discussed and what can be done to help countries that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel for the economy, what can be done, done to support their transition.

That's obviously a agenda item and, and thematic area where Saudi Arabia has been pushing a lot to consider those very important, obviously consequences. And today we discussed that as well on the just transition agenda item.

 Yeah, that's super, super interesting. Kind of related to this I wanted to talk about this phrase "unabated emissions" and why it's important for, for people to understand [00:38:00] what that means and how it gets used as a loophole.

 Yeah. Well, it's a bit related to to, to the previous question on the role of some of the technologies like carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture and storage in, in the IPCC And it's true that this, this "unabated emission" statement became very important, very much discussed because it was mentioned in the Glasgow Pact at cop 26. And the idea was that they was supposed to have a phase down of in abated emissions from coal. Notably, and, it's part of those terms that allow for consensus to be found. And because "unabated" is supposed [00:39:00] to prolong the life of the fossil fuel industry and infrastructure, because there is this, yeah, this expectations that by deploying at large scale carbon dioxide capture and, and storage we can continue to to extract fossil fuel from the ground. But then capture the emissions at the source and store them underground. And this is a technology that has been discussed for several decades. There was actually a special report produced by the IPCC in 2005, if I remember correctly, which was expected to assess the role that CCS could play in the transition. It's still, it hasn't scaled up as expected. There are still a lot of uncertainties, a lot of debate, but we can see that it came back in the discussions because some countries and economies [00:40:00] really hope very strongly that those technologies can help them continue extract for fossil fuel. And there is not very interesting discussion going on in, in the IPCC about how do we define unabated emissions what is unabated infrastructure?

And it's very, it's been going on because the IPCC obviously after COP 26 became involved in the discussions about this, this definition. So there have been authors IPCC authors trying to find some kind of definition to assess whether an infrastructure is really producing unabated emissions or, or not.

 Interesting. Okay. We've talked about non-state actors a little bit and how they've been increasingly welcomed and active in this process. Can you talk a little bit about [00:41:00] specifically, what types of non-state actors are getting involved, and where do they play a role in obstruction? obstruction?

 There are, a lot of non-state actors, but we can classify them in, in in say, NGOs and business players. And also there is more recently another non-state actor that is non-national, state actor, but in some countries are important, particularly in democratic federative countries, eh that is the subnational government.

But the most important are the business and the NGOs. At the beginning of the COPs the idea or not of non-state actors were much more NGOs because the business community was reluctant to the whole idea of the convention, okay? When there, there were some changes in perception in the business community, [00:42:00] particularly promoted by the World Economic Forum since 2014, 15, and so on.

So the business participation became very, very strong and particularly increased dramatically the, the participation of business that are related to fossil fuels corporation. So we have today this worlds of the business community and the NGOs community. And there are some NGOs that are not independent NGOs representing civil society, more public good like in the past, but that represent business interests and sometimes carbon intensive business interests.

And we can say that there are some business non-state actors that are more progressive. And they recognize the, the need of decarbonization. And there are [00:43:00] other businesses non-state actors that are clearly conservative. They are in favor, the status quo and with different discourses that are not open saying that. And we have also the NGO community. Most of the NGO community is much more representative of civil societies, national civil societies, and global civil society. But there are also significant part of growing of NGOs that are much more dependent on related of to the business community and both side. But particularly what is the major problem is with NGOs that are related to fossil fuels non-state actors.

 yeah, maybe building on on [00:44:00] that, what we see is because of this whole Paris agreement, which is expected to orchestrate action by non-state actors. We see a great interest from non-state actors and especially the private sector in COPs. They go to COPs because they can showcase their let latest technologies and solutions.

They can be part of different side events where they show how they are becoming leaders in the, in the transition. They are also there to lobby government representatives. And they have been studies and by, by different organizations really showing how they are more and more lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry being part not only of of government delegations, but also going to COPs to. part of side events to do also deals with [00:45:00] different countries and, and actors. I think there is still in general some more knowledge and research that would be needed to really understand what those actors are actually doing at COP. And what's their potential of influencing the negotiations, knowing that still today, and that has always been the case for non-state actors to have an impact and an influence on decision making processes, being it NGOs or the private sectors. It's more effective to do it nationally.

 Could I have you talk a little bit about the efforts that are working to reveal this obstruction or oppose it, including your own work, this book, you know, academic research activism, journalism.

What are the things that are pushing back against this and do you see any that are particularly [00:46:00] effective?

 Yes. So, so there has been quite a lot going on in the negotiations and also in the side events to try to name and shame in a way those actors who are obstructing negotiations, but also policy making nationally. And we can mention the  Notorious Fossil of the Day" that is being awarded by NGOs to some of the countries who have been obstructing the, the discussions. So that's, yeah, those, those kind of name and shaming, naming and shaming practices and strategies are being used a lot by civil society. What we see also, and obviously they, they provide this kind of really important moral dimension and moral argument in the negotiations is the fact that we also have a very active and influential [00:47:00] coalition of countries who are the most vulnerable to climate change. And here I'm thinking about the AOSIS, the Alliance of Small Island, developing states, which has been very active as well to kind of push for more ambitious action that has been also active in trying to bridge between different countries and developed and developing countries. And that, that's something that I find very interesting, which because it's initiative that brings together not only s countries is being pushed by them. But it also initiated also from discussions academic discussions, is this non-proliferation agreement on fossil fuel. And that's being discussed and increasingly also supported in the negotiations, which I find an interesting example of how to to build collaborations and support from different actors, being civil society, government [00:48:00] representatives, as well as researchers.

 We're coming up to the COP in Brazil, and I know Brazil came up in this chapter a couple times too. So I'm curious to hear what you think we can expect to see at this COP, what people should be looking for.

 The international situation in which this COP is going to happen is extremely difficult because of the new American administration. This is a major, major problem, but also is what I, I, I said before about the, the priority of national security. Today, how this affect all countries, eh, that has diminished the attention significantly to to climate change mitigation.

Okay? So this is a major obstacle for the convention for COP 30. And I would say that, so for [00:49:00] example, the one issue that is key in obstacle of the negotiation is the major difference of position between developing countries and developing countries, generally speaking. Okay? So this is a major obstacle, okay?

And there is for, from one side, there is less and less. Availability for financing from developed countries and from the other side, there is growing resentment in developing countries. I would say particularly in low income and low middle income countries in relation to the, to developing countries and to the, the credibility of the negotiation.

This is something is accumulating a lot. Okay. And it's, it's going to be more difficult this year, in my view. There are two things that are favorable in this. COP one is that the first one in a democratic country after three COPs in autocracies. So in the [00:50:00] environment of the COPs there is a diffuse influence of when you have a lot of, an atmosphere out of civil society mobilization that could be extremely intense in this case because Brazil is promoting the participation of civil society, national and international, even with all the vulnerability of Brazil, because has a good policy for controlling deforestation right now. But the land use change, but not about oil exploration. That is Brazil is becoming more and more one of the most important oil exported in the world. Okay, so this is the ambivalence or of the schizophrenia of the Lula administration. But anyway, it's from the Brazilian government is promoted and, and there is another thing that I think is relevant, and this is an uncertainty in my view, the uncertainty is what would be the [00:51:00] role of China in this convention?

Could China take advantage of the of the vacuum because there is no more European Union leadership. Okay? And United States is in the opposite side of the convention. So will China take advantage and change positions saying, okay, we recognize we are a global superpower, global economy superpower in all dimensions and we, cannot be considered anymore a developing country. We have many of the dimensions of developed country. Even if the per capita income is still in the high middle, income is not high, inc. I think, theoretically this could happen. There is a high probability of this to happen? [00:52:00] No, it's a low probability. But this, if there is a movement of China in that direction, whatever the specificities of this movement, this will create a new kind of environment in this scope that could diminish the negative situation of today, of the world and global climate policy.

And even could be very favorable for China, but because could, could reduce the opposition to China in democratic countries, because China is an autocracy. Okay? So there is, because theoretically because I don't have any inside information about China, okay? This, I think this could happen. The other thing that I think is important is what will be the role of the Brazilian president, not the Brazilian government behavior in the negotiation that will be like in any other country, but the Brazilian president, the, the most important goal of the [00:53:00] Brazilian pre president is securing the continuity of the negotiation.

It's a low ambition goal, okay? So, the danger is the implosion of the of COP. So this is our goal. Keep the COP going on. So for that, we need to have a very low ambition position in terms of hard matters, let's say. Okay. But we can create an atmosphere of discussion that is more forward thinking without entering in very tough issues in relation to emissions, for example.

But yes trying to, to say, how can I say that? For example, trying to circumvent, [00:54:00] try to avoid the deepening of the let's say of the risk of the.

 I would really agree with Eduardo on the question of trust and the resentment, the lack of trust that we, we have seen in the last years. I was in, in Baku at Cop 29, I was also this June in Bonn. And the, the negotiation are stuck on several issues because of the disappointment of the new collective quantified goal on, on finance, which is seen as completely way too weak by developing countries.

And I think that's being a really big challenge for the Brazilian presidency to try to bring trust [00:55:00] between the countries, but also to, to try to have, to restore trust in the process.

Taking into account also that the United States pulled out that the EU is increasingly sometimes having very, like, having to take the same statements and kind of like obstructive a bit kind of positions that the US used to take, for instance, on finance and loss and damage. So I think it's going to be an important COP to try to talk about this question of trust and resentment and how to move forward in this new, very c

Transcription

The UN processes created to deal with climate change have been infiltrated by obstructive forces since jump. In this episode, as COP 30 begins, Kari De Pryck, of the University of Geneva, and  Eduardo Viola, of the Institute of International Relations Brasil join to look at how they operate, and what we can expect to see at this year’s COP in Brazil.


S14, Ep10 | The Corruption of COP

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Brazil wants to become a world leader in sustainable fuels, but in its eagerness to take on this role, the South American COP30 host may be falling into a major trap set by the agricultural industry. The country is allocating around $500 million in public funds to corn ethanol production—and the beneficiaries of this windfall are companies with a history of environmental and labor violations.

An investigation conducted by Drilled and 

 shows that six of the seven companies involved in corn ethanol projects financed by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) over the last 12 months, or their subsidiaries, had a record of environmental violations or labor and land issues.

The only company that hadn’t had such a record began to build one shortly after its application was approved. The violations highlight the contradictions in the Brazilian corn ethanol sector's promises, which pitch themselves as sustainable while receiving billions of reais in investments as a climate solution.

BNDES guarantees that “all approved financing complies with current regulations, including from a socio-environmental, labor, and CO2 emission reduction standpoint”. But according to experts interviewed by The Intercept and Drilled, the public bank's actions are inconsistent, “reckless, and potentially irregular,” according to Bruno Teixeira Peixoto, a lawyer and legal advisor on socio-environmental and climate integrity.

“Economic and political bias often ends up overshadowing these assessments. Sometimes, certain agendas become more of a priority,” says Fábio Ishisaki, public policy advisor at the Climate Observatory. The BNDES stated that financing “the biofuel sector is part of the federal government’s strategy to support energy transition and decarbonization.”

The corn ethanol sector says it is sustainable because it promises to expand the production of grains that supply ethanol plants without deforestation, thus helping to contain the climate crisis by replacing fossil fuels with biofuel made from corn. The idea has the support of state governments, the federal government, and far-right politicians—and was brought to

” solution to address the climate crisis.

However, according to an analysis by the Climate Observatory and researchers at the Federal University of Mato Grosso (UFMT), the uncontrolled growth of corn ethanol production could indeed cause deforestation, increase greenhouse gas emissions during its production and distribution, lead to increased use of pesticides, and expand agricultural frontiers.

Even so, the sector has received a considerable amount of public funding, boosted by the enactment of the

 the country's main policy to promote decarbonization in the transportation sector and encourage the use of sustainable fuels by the Lula administration.

Since 2020, seven companies have applied for and received financing from the National Development Bank (BNDES) for corn ethanol projects. In total, R$ 3.31 billion was requested by them.

Most of this amount, R$ 2.5 billion (around USD 500 million), was financed by the National Fund on Climate Change, known as the Climate Fund. It’s part of the National Policy on Climate Change and earmarked for mitigation and adaptation projects. At least R$ 644 million had already been paid by the BNDES by August 31.

Since its creation, the Climate Fund has been used in 177 contracts for various sectors, totaling R$ 12.66 billion. The six projects linked to corn ethanol account for 19.7% of the total amount already allocated by the bank through this financial instrument. That’s well above the average of the other projects supported by the fund.

Among all Climate Fund operations, only 21 contracts exceed R$ 100 million, six of which are focused on corn ethanol. Four of these financing agreements, signed with the companies 3Tentos Agroindustrial, Coamo Agroindustrial Cooperativa, FS I Indústria de Etanol S.A., and São Martinho, are among the largest operations ever approved by the Climate Fund. Each of them contracted financing of R$ 500 million.

But the group of ethanol mill owners did not only grab funds with projects sold as sustainable. They have accumulated approximately R$ 10.14 billion in financing contracted by the BNDES in 22 years – including those from the Climate Fund. Of this amount, R$ 7.49 billion has already been released to the companies.

Although the first contracts date back to 2003, the largest volume of funds – around R$ 6.29 billion – is concentrated in projects signed since 2017, the same year that the

, Brazil’s national biofuels law, was enacted. Of this most recent amount, R$ 4.02 billion has already been released by the BNDES.

Brazil is currently experiencing a corn ethanol plant construction boom, with 24 plants in operation, 16 already authorized, and 16 announced by investors, according to the National Union of Corn Ethanol (Unem), an entity that represents the sector. This is not surprising.

The country, together with Italy and Japan, is leading efforts to establish

 to quadruple the production and use of sustainable fuels by 2035. According to sources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is an interest in opening markets and positioning Brazil as a producer of sustainable fuels—particularly sustainable aviation fuel (SAF)—and not just a supplier of raw materials for their production in emerging markets.

In the leadup to COP30, Brazil recruited other countries to sign on as well and proposed that the other signatories adopt ambitious national policies for sustainable fuels and cooperate to, among other actions, accelerate the licensing of sustainable fuel projects and related infrastructure.

 To date, 19 countries have endorsed the document.

 The so-called “Belem 4X Pledge” has some worried that President Lula’s proposed “roadmap” to phase out fossil fuels will be “paved with biofuels” as one COP30 observer put it.

Corn ethanol fits into this scenario mainly because there is a decree in the country,

, which vetoed the expansion of sugarcane cultivation and new sugarcane ethanol production facilities in the Amazon, Pantanal, and Upper Paraguay Basin, considered sensitive ecosystems. There is no such veto for corn.

Since 2017, corn ethanol plants have been concentrated in the midwest of the country, mainly in the Cerrado region of Mato Grosso. However, with the industry lobby opening the public funding  floodgates, industrial plants and monocultures are moving up to Matopiba, an agricultural frontier formed by the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia.

Among the 16 new corn ethanol plants whose construction has been authorized by the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), there are two in Bahia, one in Tocantins, and another in Rondônia. Of those announced, there are two more in Bahia, one in Tocantins, one in Piauí, and two in Pará, in the Amazon.

Financing ignores companies’ environmental violations history

Among the minimum requirements for those who want to apply for financing from the BNDES, according to

, are compliance with environmental legislation and fiscal, tax, and social obligations.

However, The Intercept Brazil, based on environmental data available on the Cruzagrafos platform, on Ibama's infractions website, and through the Access to Information Act (LAI), reveals that there are companies with a history of environmental violations that have been awarded financing.

Coamo Agroindustrial received R$500 million in approved funding for the construction of a corn ethanol plant in Campo Mourão, Paraná state. In 2018, in the same area, the company was fined more than half a million reais by Ibama for violations against the flora in the Atlantic Forest. The fine is listed as paid on the Ibama's website.

Cerradinho Bioenergia, on the other hand, had access to R$ 5 million from BNDES in 2024 to grow eucalyptus that will be used to supply a corn ethanol plant in Chapadão do Céu, Goiás state. In the same municipality, the company was fined in 2009 by Ibama for deforestation. The fine of more than R$1.3 million is still listed as awaiting payment or appeal in the federal agency's database.

São Martinho, another company on the list of seven beneficiaries of public funds from the BNDES, contracted financing in the amount of R$ 1.24 billion solely for operations related to corn ethanol – R$ 500 million of which came from the Climate Fund – for the construction of a corn ethanol plant and a silo in Quirinópolis, Goiás, and to invest in innovations at other plants.

The company has a long environmental and labor violations’ history. Between 2007 and 2008 alone, it was inspected by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, which found irregularities affecting sugarcane cutters in the workplace, such as inadequate meal areas, lack of protective equipment, and absence of periodic medical exams.

Even after several fines, São Martinho continued to violate labor standards, and

 by the Public Ministry of Labor. In 2017, it was fined for

 environmental damage resulting from the burning

 of sugarcane straw between 2007 and 2011 in Piracicaba, São Paulo state. In January of this year, it was fined R$ 5 million for

FS, with US and Brazilian capital is the first in the country to have a 100% corn ethanol production plant, had R$ 500 million in financing approved by the Climate Fund to build its fifth plant in Mato Grosso, in the municipality of Querência.

The fourth had already been announced in 2025 in Campo Novo do Parecis city, and the first three were installed starting in 2017 in Lucas do Rio Verde, Sorriso, and Primavera do Leste.

Marino José Franz, one of FS's partners, and Miguel Vaz Ribeiro, current mayor of Lucas do Rio Verde, in Mato Grosso, and also a partner in the company, have farms overlapping the Batelão Indigenous Land, in the

. The case is under federal court dispute.

In 2020, FS itself was fined by the Mato Grosso State Environment Secretariat for entering false data in forestry guides in Sisflora, the state's Forestry Product Marketing and Transportation System, according to documents obtained by The Intercept Brasil via public information requests. Forest guides are documents that record the origin, destination, and other information about wood, firewood, charcoal, and other products of plant origin. The false data consisted of license truck plates that did not exist.

The technical report on the fine emphasized that this type of commercialization allows companies to “legalize” or “launder” products and by-products of illegal origin.

FS entered 15 false vehicle license plates into the state environmental agency's official system and was fined R$ 11,500. The company did not present a defense. As it paid the fine in cash, it received a 30% discount, paying less than R$ 10,000.

A recent Reuters article states that Brazilian prosecutors are investigating illegal use of native wood to supply corn ethanol production plants. FS has said that its 87,000 hectares of planted forest, including eucalyptus and bamboo, can supply all of its operations and expansion plans. The company’s U.S. partner, Summit Agriculture, meanwhile, is embroiled in various lawsuits over its efforts to seize land via eminent domain to build 

 connecting corn ethanol facilities across multiple Midwestern states from Iowa to North Dakota.

3Tentos Agroindustrial, the only one of the seven companies on the financed list that had no environmental fines, was caught in July this year using trafficked workers in the construction of its new corn ethanol plant in Porto Alegre do Norte, Mato Grosso. The company requested R$ 500 million from the Climate Fund for this plant. R$ 200 million has already been disbursed for this operation.

 reported that government inspectors rescued 563 workers from the company's construction site, the largest rescue carried out in 2025. The money for combating the climate emergency was used by 3Tentos in a project with unsanitary housing, no water, no electricity, poor food, and even debt bondage “with strong indications of human trafficking,” according to Repórter Brasil. After the case came to light by the media, the

BNDES stated that it is currently evaluating the explanations provided by 3Tentos, which may result in a request for the return of the funds already transferred to the company.

However, the bank did not make it clear whether the history of violations is an impediment to receiving funds. It only said that all the companies mentioned in this investigation “underwent a thorough registration analysis and no final judgments were found resulting from environmental and/or labor violations that would prevent the granting of financing.”

This analysis includes an assessment of social and environmental risks, in accordance with the Socio-Environmental and Climate Management Regulations for Operations. For the Climate Fund, the bank says it also requests a calculation of CO2 emissions avoided with the implementation of the financed project. “The BNDES's Social, Environmental, and Climate Responsibility Policy also applies to the biofuel sector,” the reply concludes.

According to lawyer Bruno Teixeira Peixoto, the BNDES has duties of due diligence, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of social, environmental, and climate risks under the rules and regulations of the Central Bank of Brazil (Bacen) and the National Monetary Council (CMN).

Although for the BNDES a history of fines, penalties, or legal proceedings under appeal is not a legal impediment to financing, Peixoto considers this to be a serious point of risk exposure to which the bank is subject. “It is not prudent to rely solely on the existence of final judgments in infractions and convictions,” he says.

Financing companies with a history of environmental violations, explains Ishisaki, from the Climate Observatory, can pose risks to the bank, although it is not an impediment to granting credit. “Environmental and climate risks are not only risks of damage, but also reputational risks. If the business is seen to have a reputational risk, this must also be considered in the portfolio,” he explains.

Ishisaki points out that the bank can be held liable for financing an activity that causes environmental damage, but that there is currently a gap in this process due to the time it takes for lawsuits analyzing the guilt of companies to be processed.

For Peixoto, the bank should explain how the history of environmental fines impacts the risk rating of projects and companies to be financed. “Did this history of companies raise the project's risk rating? If so, what concrete measures and countermeasures were required and even met by the beneficiary companies?” asks the consultant. The BNDES did not respond to our questions about what documents it required.

For Peixoto, the 3Tentos case is evidence that the BNDES’s own monitoring and follow-up mechanisms are flawed, since the case came to the bank’s attention via the press.

“The responses provided by email [to The Intercept] so far do indeed reveal that the BNDES acted in a manner that was, at the very least, reckless and potentially irregular,” says Peixoto. In the case of financing through the Climate Fund, the consultant points out that there is “an inconsistency” on the part of the BNDES in releasing large sums without clear monitoring of the direct and indirect benefits in terms of climate goals.

We also contacted the companies mentioned in this report directly. São Martinho stated that “the financing obtained from the BNDES strictly follows the legal and regulatory criteria and requirements applicable to each operation.”

Cerradinho Bioenergia clarified that it sent the BNDES all the necessary documentation requested for analysis of its eligibility to receive funds from the bank. It also reported that the fine imposed on the company has been contested in an administrative proceeding with Ibama since 2009. The area in question remains embargoed.

3Tentos stated that the case did not occur at the company's facilities, “but at an external accommodation under the responsibility of the construction company hired to carry out part of the work,” and that it had not been fined.

FS and Coamo did not respond to our questions.

The new Saudi Arabia and its contradictions

Before COP30, mill owners helped build a narrative to position Brazil as the Saudi Arabia of biofuels. Selling Brazilian ethanol as sustainable is fundamental to this narrative.

The main argument of the agricultural sector regarding the sustainability of corn ethanol is that the grain used in the manufacture of biofuel is from a “second crop”, that is, planted in the same area where soybeans were harvested. This, in theory, would prevent further deforestation to open up areas for cultivation, one of the main causes of greenhouse gas emissions.

Data from the National Supply Company (Conab) show that Brazil achieved a historic record for corn production in the 2024/2025 harvest, with 141.1 million tons,

 harvest, driven by an increase in the area planted with second-crop corn. For the 2025/26 harvest, projections point to an expansion of the cultivated area in both the first (+6.1%) and second corn harvests (+3.8%), says the agency.

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COP-tastrophe: How the COP of Implementation, Truth, Forests, and Indigenous Peoples Failed on All Counts

Why Is Brazil’s Climate Fund Giving Hundreds of Millions to Big Ag?

A Reckoning with the 1.5°C Goal at COP30

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Support our reporting,subscribe today!

S14, Ep10 | The Corruption of COP

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